Criminal Law--Indictments--Indorsements on Reverse Side by F., R. W.
Volume 58 Issue 1 Article 10 
December 1955 
Criminal Law--Indictments--Indorsements on Reverse Side 
R. W. F. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. W. F., Criminal Law--Indictments--Indorsements on Reverse Side, 58 W. Va. L. Rev. (1955). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
be afforded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecu-
tions", Nye v. United States, supra, at 53; (2) the ordinary methods
for disciplining attorneys, such as suspension or disbarment,
could be used, as the dissent in the instant case stated at page 330.
It is submitted that courts use more restraint in the future,
and abstain from the extension of penal statutes ad infinitum,
particularly where the courts themselves are the immediate bene-
ficiaries, i.e., in prosecutions for contempt of court.
M. J. P.
CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMFENTS-INDORSEMENTS ON REVERSE SIDE.
-D was indicted for rape. The indorsement on the indictment
was signed by the foreman of the grand jury and by the prosecuting
attorney, but it designated D as David Lee Hudson instead of
David Lee Huffman. When D was arraigned he moved to quash
the indictment for misnomer in the indorsement, as not fulfilling
the statutory requirements of an indorsement. W. VA. CODE c. 62,
art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1955). The court overruled the motion and,
at the instance of the prosecuting attorney, amended the indorse-
ment by substituting the correct name of D. Conviction followed.
D assigns this action of the trial court as reversible error. Held,
that the misstatement of defendant's name was not fatal for the
statutory requirement that an indictment have the name of de-
fendant endorsed on its reverse side is only directory. But the
requirement that the reverse side of the indictment be signed by
the foreman of the grand jury and attested by the prosecuting at-
torney is mandatory. Verdict set aside and a new trial awarded on
different grounds. State v. Huffman, 87 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1955).
The West Virginia legislature enacted the present statute,
hereinafter referred to as the indorsement statute, in the Code of
1931 which provided that an "indictment shall have legibly in-
dorsed on the reverse side thereof the words 'State of West Virginia
versus .................... Indictment for a ..................
(Felony or Misdemeanor, as the case may be) ............... Fore-
man of the Grand Jury. Attest: .................. Prosecuting
Attroney of .................. county, West Virginia.'" W. VA.
CODE c. 62, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1955). Prior to the enactment of
the indorsement statute, the rule in West Virginia was that the
indorsement is no part of the indictment other than a mark of
identification. State v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co., 49 W. Va. 140,
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38 S.E. 539 (1901). The want of the usual memorandum on the
back of an indictment, "a true bill", signed by the foreman of the
grand jury, did not vitiate the indictment. State v. Grove, 61 MT.
Va. 697, 57 S.E. 296 (1907). Under these decisions the court order
alone was relied upon to show whether the indictment had been
returned as a true bill by the grand jury. Inasmuch as a court
order is merely reflective of what has taken place aliunde, a better
rule, even in the absence of statute, would require the authentica-
tion of an indictment to be incorporated in the instrument itself
as primary evidence of its genuineness. State v. Burnette, 118 IV.
Va. 501, 505, 190 S.E. 905, 907 (1937) (dictum). Since the indorse-
ment statute changes the common law rule, it is paramount that
we determine the legal requirements of an indorsement on the
reverse side of the indictment.
When the legislature enacts that something "shall" be done,
the requirement is mandatory unless some other provision makes it
necessary to construe "shall" as "may". But in the indorsement
statute there is no possible basis for impairment of the rigor of
the word "shall". State v. Burnette, supra at 504, 190 S.E. at 906.
Hence, every provision in the indorsement statute is mandatory.
However, it has been held that a substantial compliance with the
statute is sufficient. State v. Foley, 131 W. Va. 326, 47 S.E.2d 40
(1948). Any of the statutory requirements are mandatory, if they
are essential to the accomplishment of the clear purpose of the
indorsement statute. This purpose is the identification and authen-
tication of the indictment so as to prevent the substitution or the
use of an indicment other than the one returned by the grand jury.
State v. Huffman, supra, at 551. These last two decisions hold that
the legislature did not intend to require the entire statutory form
to be followed, but only that the signatures of the grand jury fore-
man and the prosecuting attorney be present in order to authenti-
cate and identify the indictment. Had the legislature intended
only that the foreman of the grand jury and the prosecuting at-
torney should sign the indorsement, would they not have followed
the form used prior to the enactment of the indorsement statute?
Then they would have merely provided that the indorsement
state, "a true bill" and be signed by both the named individuals.
Since the legislature provided an entirely new form and is pre-
sumed to have known the previous practice, coupled with the fact,
that they used the word "shall", they must have meant that the
entire form of indorsement was mandatory.
Since the legislature has demanded that the form of indorse.
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ment provided by the indorsement statute be followed exactly, then
the statute itself must be interpreted to determine the requirements
provided by it. The indorsement statute does not state specifically
that the prosecuting attorney and the foreman of the grand jury
shall place their signatures in the space provided for their names,
while in the preceding paragraph of the section embracing the in-
dorsement statute, the legislature expressed the intention that the
general form of indictment should be signed by, " (Signed) ."
W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1955). None of the cases
expressing the requirement that the foreman of the grand jury
must sign the indorsement, are in point. There the signature was
present. It follows that the name of the grand jury foreman may
not be required to be in his own handwriting. However, it must
have been the intention of the legislature that the signature be
present for the name of the foreman of the grand jury would serve
practically no purpose other than to authenticate and identify the
indictment.
As to the provision requiring the signature of the prosecuting
attorney, the statute is much clearer. The legislature preceded his
name with the word "attest". To attest is "to signify by subscrip-
tion of his name that the signer has witnessed the execution of the
particular instrument." BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
Therefore, it was correctly stated that the legislature has demanded
and required that every indictment returned by a grand jury in
this state shall be authenticated on the reverse side thereof by both
the signature of the grand jury foreman and the signature of the
prosecuting attorney. State v. Burnette, supra at 505, 190 S.E. at
907. "When the signature of any person is required, it must be in
his own proper handwriting, or his mark, attested, proved, or
acknowledged." W. VA. CODE c. 2, art. 2, § 10 (c) (Michie 1955).
An indictment not carrying on its back the indorsement of the
prosecuting attorney, is fatally defective on a motion to quash,
timely made. State v. Burnette, supra at 505, 190 S.E. at 907. "The
timely made motion must specifically direct the court's attention to
such defect." State v. De Board, 119 W. Va. 396, 194 S.E. 349 (1937).
"The attestation by the prosecuting attorney should be made not
later than at the time of the reporting of the indictment to the
court by the grand jury." State v. Burnette, supra at 506, 190 S.E.
at 907 (dictum). In a case in which on the back of the indictment
appeared the following "[a] true bill. Ellis Friend, Foreman, S.
W. Byrant, Acting Prosecuting Attorney," the court held, that an
attestation of an indictment by the prosecutor of a particular case,
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at the date the indictment therein is returned, is sufficient, and
substantially meets the requirement of the statute. State v. Foley,
supra at 338, 47 S.E.2d at 47. Apparently, in that case the court's
attention was not directed to the fact that this form of indorseinent,
although signed, did not comply with the indorsement statute.
In deciding the question whether the misnomer in the indorse-
ment rendered the indictment fatally defective, the court reasoned
first, that the indorsement on the indictment is not a substantive
part thereof, and therefore, a misnomer does not detract from the
legal force in the charging part of the indictment; and secondly,
that the purpose of the statutory form of indorsement is to identify
and authenticate the indictment. Since the name of the defendant
is not essential to that purpose, then the misnomer did not render
the indictment defective. As to the first argument, the court relied
upon the decisions prior to the enactment of the indorsenient
statute and therefore, failed to recognize that the legislature had
made the entire indorsement a mandatory requirement. As to the
second argument the court also did not recognize that this statutory
requirement was mandatory in its entirety. Had there been no
name of the accused in the indorsement, the statutory requirement
clearly would not have been met, and the indictment would have
been fatally defective. However, in West Virginia it is provided
that no indictment shall be abated for any misnomer of the
accused; but the court may, in the course of a trial, forthwith cause
the indictment or accusation to be amended according to the fact. W.
VA. CODE c. 62, art. 2, § 10 (Michie 1955). Since the statute applies to
any misnomer in an indictment, it includes that on the reverse side
of the indictment; therefore, the action of the trial court in per-
mitting the amendment of the indictment and inserting the correct
name of the accused, was without error, although not for the reasons
stated by the appellate court, but rather due to the curative pro-
visions of the statute. W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 2, § 10 (Michie 1955).
In conclusion, the requirements for a valid indorsement of an
indictment in West Virginia appear to be: (1) that it include the
entire form provided by the statute; (2) the signature of the fore-
man of the grand jury, although the statute does not expressly re-
quire it; (3) the signature of the prosecuting attorney; and (4) the
name of the accused in the indorsement, although a misnomer will
be cured by the provisions of the statute. W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 2,
§ 10 (Michie 1955).
R. W. F.
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